LOCKETT SYMPOSIUM

JUSTICE WHITE’S LOCKETT CONCURRENCE AND THE
EVOLVING STANDARDS FOR A CAPITAL DEFENDANT’S
MENS REA
Jordan Berman*
In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice Byron White authored a separate
concurring opinion specifically to assert that capital punishment violates
the Eighth Amendment when imposed absent “a finding that the defendant
possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim.” 1 This view was
largely vindicated when Justice White authored the opinions in Enmund
v. Florida 2 and Cabana v. Bullock, 3 in which the Court held that the death
sentence could not constitutionally be imposed on one who did not kill or
attempt to kill or have any intention of participating in or facilitating a
killing. Nonetheless, just one year after Bullock, White joined in the
majority in Tison v. Arizona to hold that the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit the death penalty even where the defendant’s mental state is one
of reckless indifference. 4 That standard exists to this day and is a marked
departure from Justice White’s stand in Lockett. It suggests a pattern of
increasing and sometimes case-specific compromises that the Court made
in order to reach the death penalty as it now exists.
Part I of this paper analyzes Justice White’s death penalty
jurisprudence leading up to Lockett, including his statement in Furman v.
Georgia 5 that the capital punishment statute at issue “has for all practical
purposes run its course.” 6 Part II reflects on the significance of Justice
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1. 438 U.S. 586, 624 (1978) (White, J., concurring).
2. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
3. 474 U.S. 376, 377 (1986).
4. 481 U.S. 137, 137-38 (1987).
5. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
6. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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White’s concurrence in Lockett, including paving the way for narrowing
the death penalty in Enmund and Bullock. Finally, Part III
analyzes Tison and the current state of the law regarding a defendant’s
mental state. The paper concludes that the principles Justice White
articulated in Lockett better represent the Court’s stated goals of
deterrence and individualized consideration.
I. JUSTICE WHITE’S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO
LOCKETT V. OHIO
Although Justice White concurred in Furman v. Georgia that the
death penalty statutes at issue constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, he made clear that his
was not a moral opposition to the existence of capital punishment overall.7
Nevertheless, Justice White provided a crucial fifth vote, resulting in a
moratorium on the death penalty in the United States. His concurrence did
not focus on any excesses of the death penalty, but rather on the
infrequency of its imposition. He noted that sentencing authority has been
vested “primarily in juries,” and those juries seem to have created a policy
in which the death penalty is hardly ever imposed, and imposed without
reasonable distinction. 8 For that reason, Justice White found that the
policy of jury discretion “has so effectively achieved its aims that capital
punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all
practical purposes run its course.” 9
By “run its course,” Justice White’s concern seemed to be that the
states weren’t imposing the death penalty often enough for it to be
effective: in other words, “that as the statutes before us are now
administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal
justice.” 10 Accordingly, Justice White believed the death penalty was no

7. Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring) (“I do not at all intimate that the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se or that there is no system of capital punishment that would comport with the
Eighth Amendment.”).
8. In Furman, “White noted the good faith of Georgia in granting discretion to sentencing
juries out of a ‘desire to mitigate the harshness’ of capital punishment laws.” Kate Stith, Byron R.
White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J. 19, 29 (1993) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 313
(White, J., concurring)). Professor Stith was a law clerk for Justice White in the October Term of
1978.
9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
10. Id.
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longer an effective deterrent if used so infrequently as to be “the pointless
and needless extinction of life” without furthering any social end. 11
Just four years later, however, he concurred with the majority in
Gregg v. Georgia that Georgia’s updated death penalty statute was
constitutional, effectively bringing the death penalty back to life. 12 Justice
White held that with the more detailed guidance to juries in Georgia law,
“if the Georgia Supreme Court properly performs the task assigned to it
under the Georgia statutes, death sentences imposed for discriminatory
reasons or wantonly or freakishly for any given category of crime will be
set aside.” 13
In fact, Justice White would have upheld all of the death penalty
statutes before the Court that day in 1976, including those states with
mandatory death sentences for certain crimes. He reasoned that a
mandatory death sentence is a consistently-imposed deterrent and
accordingly dissented from the Court’s plurality opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina holding a mandatory death sentence for first-degree
murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 14 In Roberts v.
Louisiana, Justice White similarly expressed support for Louisiana’s
mandatory death penalty scheme for five categories of first-degree
murder: “Even if the character of the accused must be considered under
the Eighth Amendment, surely a State is not constitutionally forbidden to
provide that the commission of certain crimes conclusively establishes
that the criminal’s character is such that he deserves death.” 15 Justice
White’s approval of the mandatory death penalty underlines his belief that
there is nothing inherently cruel and unusual about the death penalty
itself. 16 In particular, he noted the public support for the death penalty,
11. Id. at 312.
12. 428 U.S. 153, 154-55 (1976).
13. Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987)
(Justice White joined the majority to again find that Georgia’s death penalty was not “wantonly or
freakishly” imposed, despite statistical study purporting to show disparity in imposition of death
sentence in Georgia based on race of murder victim and defendant).
14. 428 U.S. 280, 307 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that a mandatory death sentence
does not implicate the constitutional concerns raised in Furman about “seldom and arbitrary”
imposition of the death penalty). See also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260–61 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring) (“There is good reason to anticipate, then, that as to certain categories of murderers, the
penalty will not be imposed freakishly or rarely but will be imposed with regularity; and consequently
it cannot be said that the death penalty in Florida as to those categories has ceased ‘to be a credible
deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other end of punishment in the criminal justice system.’”)
(quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring)).
15. 428 U.S. 325, 358 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 350 (White, J., dissenting) (“I also cannot agree with the petitioner’s other basic
argument that the death penalty, however imposed and for whatever crime, is cruel and unusual
punishment. . . . It is plain enough that the Constitution drafted by the Framers expressly made room
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pointing to the large number of states that re-enacted the death penalty in
the years after Furman. 17
His approval of the death penalty stemmed in part from an abiding
faith in and deference to the criminal justice system, which he repeatedly
emphasized in his opinions. 18 For this reason, he declined to interfere with
capital punishment proceedings and asserted that that prosecutors and
appellate courts, 19 legislators, 20 and juries themselves, 21 for example,
would uphold the system and correct any flaw. 22 The number of
exonerations in the years since he was on the bench may call this
conclusion into question, 23 or it may have furthered Justice White’s belief
in the power of the courts and advocates to find and correct mistakes.
Justice White recognized that the death penalty had limitations,
however, including when capital punishment is “is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime.” 24 Writing for the plurality in
Coker v. Georgia, for example, Justice White held, “We have the abiding

for the death penalty.”).
17. Id. at 352-54 (White, J., dissenting) (“The widespread re-enactment of the death penalty, it
seems to me, answers any claims that life imprisonment is adequate punishment to satisfy the need
for reprobation or retribution.”).
18. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 226 (White, J., concurring) (“I decline to interfere with the
manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce [capital punishment] . . . laws on what is simply an
assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair
manner.”).
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (“Obviously law
enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today’s decision shows that
even judges can do, but I have somewhat more faith than the Court evidently has in the ability and
desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts to discern and correct such violations
of the law.”)
20. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 355 (White, J., dissenting) (“It will not do to denigrate these legislative
judgments as some form of vestigial savagery or as purely retributive in motivation; for they are
solemn judgments, reasonably based, that imposition of the death penalty will save the lives of
innocent persons. This concern for life and human values and the sincere efforts of the States to pursue
them are matters of the greatest moment with which the judiciary should be most reluctant to
interfere.”).
21. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“[I]t should not be
assumed that juries will disobey or nullify their instructions.”).
22. For this reason as well, Justice White believed that capital punishment for minors was
constitutional, for example when he joined the dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815, 87576 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that “what the laws of the Federal Government and 19
States clearly provide for represents a ‘considered judgment,’” and that the Governor of Oklahoma
“[w]ould certainly have used his pardon power if there was some mistake here.”) (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2757 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
number of exonerations in capital cases has risen to 115.”) (citations omitted); Kansas v. Marsh, 548
U.S. 163, 207–08 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (DNA exonerations constitute “a new body of fact”
when considering the constitutionality of capital punishment).
24. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and
irrevocability,’ is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does
not take human life.” 25 In that 1977 opinion, he also noted that a defendant
may be eligible for the death penalty in Georgia “when in the commission
of a felony he causes the death of another human being, irrespective of
malice,” so long as there are aggravating factors.26 If he seemed concerned
about the death penalty’s application to those who did not intend to cause
death, he did not reflect it in that opinion, though that was not the subject
of Coker. His concern about a capital defendant’s mens rea, even for
murder cases, became clear in Lockett the following year.
II. JUSTICE WHITE’S CONCURRENCE IN LOCKETT AND THE
SUBSEQUENT NARROWING OF THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ON MENS
REA
In Lockett, the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio death penalty
statute that did not permit individualized consideration of certain
mitigating factors in capital cases holding that such a restriction violated
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 27 The petitioner in that case
stayed in the car while her associates robbed a pawn shop.28 Although
there was no plan to kill, the pawnbroker grabbed the gun when one of the
robbers announced the “stickup.” 29 The pawnbroker was killed when the
gun went off. 30 A plurality of the Court reversed the petitioner’s death
sentence because the Ohio statute “did not permit the sentencing judge to
consider, as mitigating factors, [the petitioner’s] character, prior record,
age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in
the crime.” 31 Other than listing the lack of specific intent as a mitigating
factor, the Court did not delve into whether it was appropriate to execute
someone without an intent to kill.
Justice White devoted his concurrence to requiring a mens rea of
intent for capital punishment: in particular, to the principle, “ignored by
the plurality, that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the penalty
of death without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause
25. Id. at 598 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)); see also Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, Syllabus ¶ 3 (1983) (Justice White joined the majority in finding “life imprisonment
without possibility of parole is significantly disproportionate to” a minor crime, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
26. Id. at 600.
27. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
28. Id. at 590.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 597.
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the death of the victim.” 32 Although Justice White did not agree that
limiting consideration of mitigating circumstances was unconstitutional,
he found that the Ohio statute in that case violated his proportionality
requirement in two ways: 1) the “extremely rare” imposition of the death
penalty “upon those who were not found to have intended the death of the
victim” makes no measurable contribution to the acceptable goals of
punishment; and 2) the sentence is “grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.” 33
Regarding the extreme rarity, Justice White found it “clear from
recent history that the infliction of death under circumstances where there
is no purpose to take life has been widely rejected as grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the crime.” 34 He noted that only eight
executions since 1954 clearly involved individuals who did not commit
the murder—far fewer than those executed for rape—though he seems to
acknowledge that this is a separate measurement from those who intended
to cause the death of the victim. 35 Justice White also found any “deterrent”
value in executing those without a purpose to kill is “extremely
attenuated,” as it is doubtful that people will be deterred from “becoming
involved in ventures in which death may unintentionally result.” 36 This
doubt was particularly strong in light of the “occasional and erratic basis”
on which such executions occur. 37 Accordingly, Justice White stated that
“society has made a judgment . . . distinguishing at least for purpose of
the imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of those who
acted with and those who acted without a purpose to destroy human
life.” 38
Justice White found particularly problematic that Ohio seemed to be
imposing the death penalty in cases with a mens rea of at most
“recklessness: conduct undertaken with knowledge that death is likely
to follow.” 39 Accordingly, he argued that such a punishment was
unconstitutionally disproportionate, concluding, “Since I would hold that
32. Id. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Id. (citing his own opinion in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
34. Id. at 625.
35. Id. at 624-25.
36. Id. at 625.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 626. Justice White cited to United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., for the principle that
such distinctions have deep roots in the history of criminal law. 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (“We start
with the familiar proposition that ‘[the] existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception
to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.’” (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
39. Id. at 627-28.
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death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth
Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with
the conscious purpose of producing death, these sentences must be set
aside.” 40
The Court soon adopted Justice White’s view that
the death penalty was disproportionate for a defendant who had not
intended for death to occur, at least for those who had not themselves
killed or attempted to kill. In particular, Justice White established his view
as law as the author of Enmund v. Florida just four years after Lockett. 41
In that case, Florida authorized the death penalty against petitioner
Enmund for aiding and abetting a robbery in the course of which murder
was committed, even though Enmund was not physically present at the
killing. 42 The Court first noted the rarity of executions for such
circumstances, both legislatively, 43 and as sought by prosecutors and
imposed by juries. 44 On this point, the Court concluded that the death
penalty appeared disproportionate:
Petitioner’s argument is that because he did not kill, attempt to
kill, and he did not intend to kill, the death penalty is disproportionate
as applied to him, and the statistics he cites are adequately tailored to
demonstrate that juries—and perhaps prosecutors as well—consider
death a disproportionate penalty for those who fall within his category. 45

Relying on Lockett, the Court emphasized focusing on the petitioner’s
own culpability, “not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot
the victims, for we insist on ‘individualized consideration as a
constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence . . . .’” 46
Accordingly, the Court found petitioner’s death sentence invalid:
“Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly
different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them

40. Id. at 628; see also Ursula Bentele, Multiple Defendant Cases: When the Death Penalty Is
Imposed on the Less Culpable Offender, 38 Rᴜᴛɢᴇʀs L. Rᴇᴄ. 119, 123 n.33 (2010-2011) (collecting
articles).
41. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
42. Id. at 784.
43. Id. at 792 (“Thus only a small minority of jurisdictions—eight—allow the death penalty to
be imposed solely because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a
murder was committed.”).
44. Id. at 795 (“That juries have rejected the death penalty in cases such as this one where the
defendant did not commit the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not
participate in a plot or scheme to murder is also shown by petitioner’s survey of the Nation’s deathrow population.”).
45. Id. at 796.
46. Id. at 798 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (footnote omitted)).
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alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the
Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.” 47
Similarly to his Lockett concurrence, Justice White again noted in
Enmund that the death penalty for those who did not kill or intend to kill
has limited retributive or deterrent value.48
While Justice White’s Lockett concurrence proposed a categorical
death penalty rule requiring a purpose to kill, his Enmund opinion
“displayed on its surface a marked ambivalence” about making such a rule
into law. 49 Rather, Justice White framed the question in Enmund as
whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death
penalty “for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended
to take life.” 50 At the same time, he indicated that the death penalty might
apply to those who “intended or contemplated that life would be taken,” 51
or “anticipated that lethal force would or might be used” to effectuate a
robbery or escape, not merely those with a purpose to kill.52 Unlike in
Lockett, Justice White’s Enmund analysis does not seem to apply at all to
actual killers—rather than accomplices—who lacked an intent to kill,
although such a scenario was not relevant to the facts of Enmund. 53
Rather, Justice White emphasized “Enmund’s intentions, expectations,
and actions” and the fact that he was not physically present for the
killing. 54 Some have speculated that these departures were to gain Justice
Blackmun’s vote, who expressed some unease at Justice White’s broad
assertions in Lockett. 55
47. Id.
48. Id. at 798-99 (“We are quite unconvinced, however, that the threat that the death penalty
will be imposed for murder will measurably deter one who does not kill and has no intention or
purpose that life will be taken.”); id. at 801 (“Putting Enmund to death to avenge two killings that he
did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not measurably contribute to the
retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts.”); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of Death, 31
B.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1103, 1147 (1990).
50. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787.
51. Id. at 801 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 788.
53. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Under those
circumstances the conclusion is unavoidable that the infliction of death upon those who had no intent
to bring about the death of the victim is not only grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime
but also fails to contribute significantly to acceptable, or indeed any perceptible goals of
punishment.”).
54. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 786, 800 (emphasis added).
55. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1147 n.140 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 614 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (finding a “requirement of actual intent to kill in order to inflict the death penalty”
unworkable and an incomplete determination of culpability)).
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Regardless of any ambiguity in Enmund itself, Justice White’s
decision four years later in Cabana v. Bullock seemed to make his position
clear: Enmund “imposes a categorical rule: a person who has not in fact
killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal
force be used may not be sentenced to death.” 56 Bullock seems to make
clear that contemplating or anticipating the taking of a life is not enough
if that person “did not themselves kill, or attempt to kill, or intend to
kill.” 57 Accordingly, the Court directed the district court to issue a habeas
corpus writ vacating the petitioner’s death sentence but leaving to the
State the choice of either imposing a sentence of life imprisonment or
reimposing the death sentence after determining whether respondent in
fact “killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or intended that lethal force
would be used.” 58
After Bullock, the law had largely enshrined Justice White’s Lockett
concurrence requiring an intent to kill before capital punishment can be
imposed. This restriction only applied to accomplices, and not those who
committed or attempted to commit the murder. Nonetheless, it was a
concrete manifestation of Justice White’s philosophy that executions
should be limited to those for whom there would be the greatest deterrent
and retributive value and that any such value is tenuous at best for an
accomplice without an intent to kill.
III. RE-EXPANSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOLLOWING TISON
A.

Justice White’s Reversal in Tison

Although Enmund and Bullock seemed to make clear that the law
required intent to kill for accomplices, the Court reversed course just one
year after Bullock in Tison v. Arizona. 59 Petitioners in that case sprung
their father from prison, “armed their father and another convicted
murderer, later helped to abduct, detain, and rob a family of four, and
watched their father and the other convict murder the members of that
family with shotguns.” 60 Both petitioners stated that they were “surprised
by the shooting,” though they did not attempt to help the victims. 61 The
Court accepted that neither petitioner intended to kill, 62 but held that
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
Id. at 385.
Id. at 392.
481 U.S. 137 (1987).
Id. at 137 (syllabus).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 151 (“Petitioners do not fall within the ‘intent to kill’ category of felony murderers
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Enmund did not render unconstitutional the death penalty for defendants
such as the Tisons, “whose participation is major and whose mental state
is one of reckless indifference to the value of human life.” 63 The Tison
court did not explicitly overrule Enmund, but instead more or less limited
that decision to its facts: that the death penalty was unconstitutional for
“the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.” 64
While departing from Enmund, Tison mirrored some of the earlier
opinion’s reasoning to justify its shift. For example, the Tison court noted
that sixteen states “authorize the death penalty in a felony-murder case
where, though the defendant’s mental state fell short of intent to kill, the
defendant was a major actor in a felony in which he knew death was
highly likely to occur.” 65 The Tison court also relied on a number of state
court decisions that imposed the death penalty after Enmund, even without
a clear “intent to kill.” 66 The opinion went so far as to reverse the Arizona
Supreme Court’s finding that the Tisons had an “intent to kill,” in order
to explicitly hold that such a finding was not required by Enmund. 67
Rather, the Tison Court concluded that “intent to kill” is “a highly
unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and
dangerous of murderers.” 68 Accordingly, the Court held that “the reckless
disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable
mental state” that may support a capital sentence. 69 All of the examples
the Court cited to support this standard, however, concerned the person
actually doing the killing—a torturer or robber with reckless
indifference—rather than an accomplice. 70
Although Justice White had repeatedly advocated for limiting the
death penalty to those who either “killed, attempted to kill, or intended
that a killing take place or that lethal force be used,” 71 he joined the Tison

for which Enmund explicitly finds the death penalty permissible under the Eighth Amendment.”).
63. Id. at 152.
64. Id. at 149.
65. Id. at 153-54. As the dissent pointed out, this reasoning did not account for the number of
states that didn’t authorize any death penalty, nor did it consider how many states actually imposed
the death penalty in such circumstances. Id. at 175-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 154-55 (collecting cases).
67. Id. at 155 n.11.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. at 157-58.
70. Id. at 157.
71. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
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majority to abrogate that standard. 72 The reasons for this change in
thought are unclear, although the extreme facts of Tison “perhaps explain
Justice White’s abrupt abandonment of this decade-long effort to require
an intent to kill as a prerequisite for the death penalty.” 73 The Tison dissent
certainly thought so, noting that the decision to execute the Tisons
“appears responsive less to reason than to other, more visceral,
demands.” 74 In fact, the dissent cited at length Justice White’s own
decisions in Enmund and Bullock and his concurrence in Lockett about the
importance of “[d]istinguishing intentional from reckless action in
assessing culpability . . . in felony-murder cases” to argue against the
standard Tison established. 75 Nonetheless, Tison has remained the law of
the land for the decades since it was decided, essentially if not officially
overruling Justice White’s earlier mens rea standards for capital
defendants.
B.

The Legacy of Tison and Justice White’s Jurisprudence on Death
Penalty Mens Rea Requirements

If Justice White’s goal was to use mens rea to limit capital
punishment to only the most culpable defendants, his joining the majority
in Tison appears to have severely undermined that goal. As Tison allowed
a recklessness standard even for accomplices, “the Tison standard
rationally can be held to apply to every felony murder accomplice.” 76
After all, “such recklessness and indifference are presumed” when the
actor is engaged in a dangerous felony. 77 Accordingly, Justice White’s
72. See Robert Batey, Categorical Bars to Execution: Civilizing the Death Penalty, 45 Hᴏᴜs.
L. Rᴇᴠ. 1493, 1515–16 (2009) (citing Tison, 481 U.S. at 138).
73. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1151. See also Batey, supra note 73, at 1515–16 n.131 (citing
Christopher E. Smith, Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The Tension Between Clarity in
Legal Doctrine and Justices’ Policy Preferences, 16 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 119, 133-37 (1989)
(hypothesizing that the majority opinion was a judicial compromise designed to condemn the Tisons
without overruling Enmund)).
74. Tison, 481 U.S. at 184-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The urge to employ the felony-murder
doctrine against accomplices is undoubtedly strong when the killings stir public passion and the actual
murderer is beyond human grasp.”). Eventually, the Tison brothers were resentenced to life in state
court. See Richard Ruelas, The Story of Gary Tison’s Fateful Final Escape—From Those Who Were
ARIZONA
REP.
(Sept.
19,
2017,
05:55
AM),
There,
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-best-reads/2017/09/19/arizona-tison-gangspree-prison-escape-1978/660262001/ [https://perma.cc/68KZ-92Y2].
75. Id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1162 (“In every felony murder case, the defendant has agreed to
commit a dangerous felony and, as a result, someone has ended up dead.”).
77. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b) (“Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if
the actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of
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statement in Lockett “that death may not be inflicted for killings consistent
with the Eighth Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged
in conduct with the conscious purpose of producing death,” has since been
eviscerated by Tison. 78
Some of the problems with Tison were visible from the moment it
was decided. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, citing Justice
White’s Lockett concurrence, a person who acts recklessly is
“qualitatively different” from a person who acted with intent: “[B]ecause
that person has not chosen to kill, his or her moral and criminal culpability
is of a different degree than that of one who killed or intended to kill.”79
Moreover, identifying recklessness is significantly more complicated than
identifying intent: “[A] court looking at reckless indifference to human
life is essentially expressing a moral judgment, a judgment of the
culpability of, and not merely the purpose underlying, a defendant’s
acts.” 80 Justice White himself has repeatedly recognized the difficulty in
defining “reckless disregard” in other context such as libel suits. 81
Accordingly, the Court went from an identifiable and narrow mens rea
standard to one that was both qualitatively broader and more difficult to
define.
A key consequence of Tison is the decline of an individual’s personal
culpability as the key measure of who should or should not be sentenced
to death. Justice Brennan noted that Tison, for example, “left open the
issue whether a court may constitutionally attribute to a defendant as an
aggravating factor the manner in which other individuals carried out the
killings” or “whether the purposes for which other individuals committed
a crime can be constitutionally attributed to a defendant as an aggravating
force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape.”).
78. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 627–28 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
79. Tison, 481 U.S. at 170-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[S]ociety has made a judgment, which
has deep roots in the history of the criminal law . . . distinguishing at least for purpose of the
imposition of the death penalty between the culpability of those who acted with and those who acted
without a purpose to destroy life.”) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 626-28 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
80. Rosen, supra note 50, at 1154 (“As the Court has acknowledged elsewhere, this process
reflects that the concept of reckless indifference is not a fact but a highly subjective evaluative
judgment with no common core of meaning.”).
81. See, e.g., St. Amant. v. Thompson St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968) (Justice White,
writing for the Court, stating that “‘reckless disregard’ . . . cannot be fully encompassed in one
infallible definition. Inevitably its outer limits will be marked out through case-by-case
adjudication.”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, unlike “actual knowledge,” he does “not believe that the ‘reckless disregard’
component of the New York Times malice standard is a question of historical fact.”).
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circumstance.” 82 Citing to Lockett, he noted that “such vicarious
attribution ’would seem to violate the core Eighth Amendment
requirement that capital punishment be based upon an “individualized
consideration” of the defendant’s culpability.’” 83
For example, the individualized consideration for capital defendants
became further attenuated after Tison due to the consideration of victim
impact evidence. The Court in Payne v. Tennessee 84 relied on Tison to
hold that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit victim impact evidence
at sentencing, even if the defendant was unaware of the impact discussed.
The Court held that “the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a
result of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern
of the criminal law. . . in determining the appropriate punishment.” 85 In
fact, Tison was the sole case the majority cited—joined by Justice
White—to justify looking at harm when considering a death sentence:
“[I]f the robbery in which the first defendant participated results in the
death of a victim, he may be subjected to the death penalty, but if the
robbery in which the second defendant participates does not result in the
death of a victim, the death penalty may not be imposed.” 86 Justice White
himself expressed support for this position after Tison, irrespective of the
defendant’s intention to cause such harm: “There is nothing aberrant in a
juror’s inclination to hold a murderer accountable not only for his internal
disposition in committing the crime but also for the full extent of the harm
he caused. . . .” 87 In other words, Justice White no longer treated a

82. White v. Dugger, 483 U.S. 1045, 1049 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari and stay) (citation omitted).
83. Id. (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605); see also Lynn D. Wittenbrink, Overstepping
Precedent? Tison v. Arizona Imposes the Death Penalty on Felony Murder Accomplices, 66 N.C. L.
Rᴇᴠ. 817, 837 (1988) (“Rather than admit that the Court focused on the harm committed by Gary
Tison, the father of the defendants, the Court invoked a contrived distinction between Enmund and
Tison.”) (emphasis in original).
84. 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).
85. Id. (“Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of different
offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.”).
86. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 148 (1987)).
87. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), overruled by
Payne, 501 U.S. at 830. Justice White encouraged juries to consider harm due in part to his faith in
the system, in particular that the Court should not presume that the jury will consider impermissible
factors such as the race of the victim. Id. at 517 (citations omitted).
I fail to see why the State cannot, if it chooses, include as a sentencing consideration the
particularized harm that an individual’s murder causes to the rest of society and in particular to his family. To the extent that the Court is concerned that sentencing juries might
be moved by victim impact statements to rely on impermissible factors such as the race of
the victim, there is no showing that the statements in this case encouraged this, nor should
we lightly presume such misconduct on the jury’s part.
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defendant’s culpability as a clear line demarcating who can and cannot
face capital punishment.
Despite his support for victim impact evidence, Justice White
continued to be troubled by expanding the penalties for those without the
sufficiently culpable intent. In his final years on the Court, Justice White
dissented from a non-capital opinion upholding a statutorily mandated
penalty of life without possibility of parole for narcotics possession by
citing to his opinion in Enmund: “To be constitutionally proportionate,
punishment must be tailored to a defendant’s personal responsibility and
moral guilt.” 88 He seemed particularly troubled by an opinion upholding
a death penalty delivered under instructions that did not require the jury
to agree on one of the alternative theories of premeditated and felony
murder. That case, Schad v. Arizona, relied on Tison to note that anyone
convicted of felony murder could be presumed to have the requisite intent,
and could be viewed as equivalent to one who committed premeditated
murder:
Whether or not everyone would agree that the mental state that precipitates death in the course of robbery is the moral equivalent of premeditation, it is clear that such equivalence could reasonably be found, which
is enough to rule out the argument that this moral disparity bars treating
them as alternative means to satisfy the mental element of a single offense. 89

Justice White, in his dissent, found such equivalence “unbelievable,” and
asserted felony murder does not automatically qualify for the death
penalty without further findings such as mens rea:
Thus, this Court has required that in order for the death penalty to be
imposed for felony murder, there must be a finding that the defendant in
fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that
lethal force be used or that the defendant was a major participant in the
felony and exhibited reckless indifference to human life. 90

Although this statement accurately sums up the conclusions of Tison,
Justice White neglected to see that the expansive view in Schad—
allowing the death penalty for any felony murder—was a direct result of
that earlier decision. Once the Court declared that recklessness and major
88. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1023 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
89. 501 U.S. 624, 644 (1991).
90. Id. at 658-59 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797;
Tison, 481 U.S. at 158).
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participation are sufficient to impose the death penalty on an accomplice,
it is difficult to conceive of a murder in which a factfinder could not be
satisfied that such expansive and generalized concepts are met. 91 Justice
White’s assertion in Lockett, that “it violates the Eighth Amendment to
impose the penalty of death without a finding that the defendant possessed
a purpose to cause the death of the victim,” accordingly has long since
failed to be the rule of the Court. 92
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice White’s majority opinions in Enmund and Bullock were the
fruition of the principles espoused in his Lockett concurrence: that the
Court “insist[s] on ‘individualized consideration as a constitutional
requirement in imposing the death sentence,’” 93 and that the death penalty
for those who did not kill or intend to kill has limited retributive or
deterrent value. 94 Thus, Justice White for a time succeeded in establishing
a “categorical rule: a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill,
or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used may not be
sentenced to death.” 95 Even though this standard imposed a higher mens
rea requirement only on those who did not themselves kill or attempt to
kill, it nonetheless represented a significant red line demarcating the
acceptable outer limits of eligibility for capital punishment.
When Justice White joined the majority in Tison, however, any such
limitation disappeared. Now, the death penalty is available even for those
who did not kill, attempt to kill, or even intend for a killing to take place,
so long as they were a major participant in the felony and exhibited
reckless indifference to human life.96 The expansion of the death penalty
decimated the categorical limit on eligibility, at least as far as mens rea is
concerned. This expansive practice exists to this day. 97
91. Id. at 645 (“There we held that ‘the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents [such] a highly culpable
mental state . . . that [it] may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when
that conduct causes its natural, though not inevitable, lethal result.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting
Tison, 481 U.S. at 157-58).
92. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 624 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (citing Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605(footnote omitted)).
94. Id. at 798-99, 801; see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
95. Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 386 (1986).
96. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.
97. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mississippi, 138 S. Ct. 2567, 2570 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the denial of certiorari) (“Mississippi is one of a small number of States in which defendants may be
(and, in Mississippi’s Second Circuit Court District, routinely are) sentenced to death for, among
other things, felony robbery murder without any finding or proof of intent to kill.”).
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As noted above, this expanded understanding of the death penalty
undermines the Court’s stated goals of deterrence and individualized
consideration. As a result of Tison, a defendant may be sentenced to death
for the fatal conduct of someone else involved in the felony, even if the
defendant did not intend or even know that a killing would occur. 98 This
results in a lack of individualized consideration—being punished for
something the defendant perhaps did not do or even know about—as well
as a lack of deterrence effect. As Justice White explained in Lockett, after
all, if one is unaware that a killing will occur, the death penalty is unlikely
to enter the calculous of whether to proceed with a felony. 99 While there
continues to be a requirement that a defendant display reckless
indifference to qualify for capital punishment, any individual engaged in
a dangerous felony can potentially satisfy that requirement. 100
Accordingly, any deterrent value for the death penalty in such cases—on
the chance that a fatality may occur, even if one is not planned or
foreseen—is minimal at best.
In fact, the Court continues to note with approval the standards
espoused by Enmund and Bullock, to the extent they survive beyond
Tison, In Graham v. Florida, for example, the Court relied on Enmund to
hold that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life without parole sentences
for juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide:
The Court has recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to kill,
or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the
most serious forms of punishment than are murderers. . . It follows that,
when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. 101

The Court also relied on Enmund to prohibit the death penalty for
“mentally retarded criminals” due in part to lack of deterrent value: “[I]t
seems likely that ‘capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when
murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.’” 102
98. See supra Part IV.
99. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 625 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The value
of capital punishment as a deterrent to those lacking a purpose to kill is extremely attenuated.
Whatever questions may be raised concerning the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to
intentional murders — and that debate rages on — its function in deterring individuals from becoming
involved in ventures in which death may unintentionally result is even more doubtful.”).
100. See supra Part III.
101. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010) (citations omitted).
102. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (“The theory of deterrence in capital
sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct.”) (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799)).
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If the Court continues to uphold the death penalty, the Court’s oftcited principles of individualized consideration and deterrence would be
better served by adopting Justice White’s Lockett requirement in capital
cases of “a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with the
conscious purpose of producing death . . . .” 103 An “intent” standard for
capital defendants at the very least should apply to those who themselves
did not kill or attempt to kill, if not for all capital defendants. To hold
otherwise allows the death penalty to proceed regardless of individual
culpability or deterrent value in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 104

103. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 628 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (“A penalty with such
negligible returns to the State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative
of the Eighth Amendment.”).

